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 NOTE 
Exploring the Abstract: Patent Eligibility 
Post Alice Corp v. CLS Bank 
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
JOHN CLIZER 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most Americans are probably aware of the patent system.  For instance, 
most people know that someone who develops a new machine or process can 
seek a patent for it from the U.S. government.1  Most people are also proba-
bly aware that there must be some limits on what things can and cannot be 
patented.  For instance, the idea that one could not patent such things as the 
moon or the sun, forces of nature such as wind or gravity, or abstract things 
such as love, trust, or happiness would not be surprising to many.  It can be-
come somewhat more difficult to consider whether one should be able to 
patent more concrete things.  For instance, while one might assume that Sir 
Isaac Newton might not have been able to take out a patent on the concept of 
gravity, what about his law of universal gravitation or its accompanying 
mathematical equation – things that took considerable work and effort to de-
velop?  Could Albert Einstein have sought a patent for his famous mass ener-
gy equivalence equation?  Could the Ford Motor Company receive a patent 
on its process of assembling cars using interchangeable parts on an assembly 
line?  Could someone seek to patent such elementary business practices as 
double-entry bookkeeping, collective investments through the use of mutual 
funds, or the use of a clearinghouse to reduce settlement risk?  Could some-
one claim a patent on an improvement on these business methods by, say, 
introducing the use of a computer? 
These questions lie at the heart of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
the case of Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International.2  The decision 
concerns one of the three longstanding common law exceptions to patent 
eligibility: abstract ideas.3  In the course of the decision, the Court attempted 
to settle an issue that it had seldom addressed.  The patents at issue in the case 
reflect concerns surrounding the patenting of both business methods and 
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 1. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 2. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 3. Id. at 2354. 
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software, two areas that have proved somewhat complicated for the lower 
courts to navigate.4  At heart, the claimed patents represent a process for per-
forming business transactions, commonly referred to as business method pa-
tents.  But the primary improvement claimed in the patent was the application 
of a computer and related software.  Thus, the Court’s decision reflected on 
both areas of patent law.  In a unanimous decision, the Court determined that 
the claimed patents were drawn to an abstract idea and were therefore ineligi-
ble for patent protection.5 
While the outcome of the case is noteworthy, the real significance is that 
the Court used this case to formally adopt a new test to be applied in cases 
concerning potential abstract ideas.  This test is actually a reconfiguration of 
an earlier test developed for a similar problem regarding the so-called natural 
phenomenon exception.6  The test consists of two parts.7  The first asks 
whether there is, in fact, an abstract idea in the claimed patent.8  The second 
part then goes on to ask if there is any “inventive concept” that will transform 
the abstract idea and make it patent eligible.9 
While the adoption of this test is helpful because it takes the burden off 
the lower courts to devise their own tests, the decision leaves open quite a 
few questions and raises several new ones.  For instance, the Court directly 
refused to give a definition of the term “abstract,” though it did help provide 
some important clues that build and expand on previous precedent and poten-
tially widen its use.10  There is also a concern regarding the “inventive con-
cept” requirement in that this seemingly innocuous phrase may be misinter-
preted to mean less than the Court meant it to say.  Finally, there is the ever-
important concern of reading this case in light of past decisions including the 
seemingly contradictory case of Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myr-
iad Genetics in order to grasp a full understanding of the Court’s decisions in 
the area of patent eligibility.11  Indeed, Alice will clearly have a profound 
impact on the law of intellectual property, though it is difficult to determine 
exactly what those eventual effects will be. 
This Note first sets forth the facts and the ultimate holding of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Alice.  It then details the historical background 
surrounding the ineligibility of abstract ideas for patent protection that has 
arisen from the Supreme Court and lower federal courts’ past decisions.  
Next, it examines in more in detail the Court’s reasoning as applied in this 
particular case.  Finally, this Note discusses several of the questions raised by 
the Court’s decision: what exactly constitutes an “abstract idea,” what is the 
 
 4. Id. at 2353. 
 5. Id. at 2352. 
 6. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012). 
 7. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. at 2357. 
 11. See 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
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full meaning of the Court’s “inventive concept” requirement, and how are we 
to interpret this decision in light of Court’s decision in Myriad? 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Alice Corporation (“Alice Corp.”), an Australian entity and the petition-
er in the suit, was the assignee of four patents granted by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office between 1993 and 2005.12  The purpose of the underlying 
invention in these patents was to mitigate settlement risks, the risk that only 
one party in a financial exchange will satisfy its obligation.13  The patents did 
this through the use of a computer as a third party intermediary.14  The com-
puter was tasked with creating “shadow” accounts that mirrored the real 
world accounts of exchange institutions such as banks.15  The computer up-
dated these accounts in real time as transactions occurred and only allowed 
transactions when the records indicated that the transacting party had suffi-
cient funds to satisfy the obligation.16  The computer then passed along only 
the allowed transactions to the actual financial institutions, “thus mitigating 
the risk that only one party would perform the agreed upon exchange.”17  Put 
in substantially simpler terms, the patent was a way of performing the func-
tions typically performed by a clearinghouse with a computer.18  The actual 
patents included both the described method for mitigation risk, a computer 
system for carrying out the method, and the media that contained the program 
code.19 
CLS Bank International and CLS Services Ltd., which together form 
CLS Bank, the respondent in the case, is a company that operates “a global 
network that facilitates currency transactions.”20  In May 2007, CLS brought 
suit against Alice Corp. in the Federal District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia “seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, patent invalidi-
ty, and patent unenforceability.”21  Alice Corp. responded by counter claim-
 
 12. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2352 & n.1.  The Patents in question were 
United States Patent Nos. 5,970,479, 6,912,510, 7,149,720, and 7,725,375.  Id.; see 
U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479 (filed May. 28, 1993); U.S. Patent No. 6,912,510 (filed 
May. 9, 2000); U.S. Patent No. 7,149,720 (filed Dec. 31, 2002); U.S. Patent No. 
7,725,375 (filed Jun 27, 2005). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. (quoting CLS Bank Int’l. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1285 
(Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Clearinghouse, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/120846/clearinghouse (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
 19. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2353. 
 20. Id. 
 21. CLS Bank Int’l., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 228. 
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ing infringement by CLS Bank.22  Both parties then filed cross motions for 
summary judgment to determine whether the asserted claims were patent 
eligible.23  The district court held that all of the asserted claims were ineligi-
ble for patent protection because they contained patent-ineligible subject mat-
ter, specifically that of an abstract idea.24 
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit25 re-
versed the district court’s holding, reasoning that it was not “manifestly evi-
dent” that Alice Corp.’s claims were an abstract idea.26  CLS then filed a re-
quest for a rehearing en banc, which was granted27 and which vacated the 
circuit court’s panel opinion.28  The en banc review held, in a very brief per 
curiam opinion, that Alice Corp.’s claims were not patent eligible and af-
firmed the decision of the District Court.29  The Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peal’s en banc panel was deeply divided over the issues.  The five-member 
plurality held that none of Alice Corp.’s claims were patent eligible.30  They 
held that the claims did no more than “draw on the abstract idea of reducing 
settlement risk by effecting trades through a third-party intermediary.”31  A 
four-member minority argued to reverse the district court’s determination that 
Alice Corp.’s system claims were ineligible.32 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and ultimate-
ly affirmed the en banc decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.33  In 
doing so, the Court first held that the two-step framework for determining the 
patent eligibility of applications – originally set forth for laws of nature in 
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories – would be applied 
 
 22. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2353. 
 23. Id. 
 24. CLS Bank Int’l., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 255. 
 25. This is an intermediate-level court that hears all patent and trademark appeals 
among other issues.  United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/901154/
United-States-Court-of-Appeals-for-the-Federal-Circuit (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
 26. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 27. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 484 Fed. Appx. 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(unpublished). 
 28. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (2013). 
 29. Id. at 1274. 
 30. Id. at 1274. 
 31. Id. at 1286. 
 32. Id. at 1292.  Of this minority, two would still uphold the majority’s decision 
regarding the method claim.  Id.  One judge wrote a separate opinion also holding that 
the system claims were patent eligible.  Id. at 1313-14 (Moore, J., dissenting in part).  
Another judge filed a separate dissent claiming that all of Alice Corp.’s claims were 
patent eligible.  Id. at 1321, 1327 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  Two other judges filed a separate dissent that came to the same conclusion.  Id. 
at 1327, 1333 (Linn, J. & O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 33. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). 
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to claims of abstract ideas.34  The Court then applied this newly refurbished 
test and further held that the claims at issue did in fact encompass an abstract 
idea and that the proposed method claims failed to transform the abstract idea 
into a patent-eligible invention.35  Finally, the Court held that the media and 
systems claims were substantially similar to the methods claim and that they 
were therefore also patent ineligible.36 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The power of the U.S. government to grant patents has existed since the 
country’s founding.  It is one of the powers specifically outlined and granted 
to Congress in the U. S. Constitution.37  The Constitution states that Congress 
shall have the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”38  Of course, there are limitations 
on what can be patented and what cannot.  For instance, Congress has enacted 
statutory language that sets out the limits on what types of things might be 
patented.39  The language of the statute reads: “Whoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”40 
In addition to the statutory provision, the Supreme Court has also creat-
ed several exceptions to what can properly be patented.  For example, the 
Court has held that natural phenomena, even a previously unknown natural 
phenomenon, cannot be patented.41  The Court has stated that such things as 
the qualities of certain bacteria, “like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the 
qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men.”42  In 
a similar vein, the Court has held that laws of nature cannot be patented ei-
ther.43  For instance, the Court has noted that Einstein could not have patented 
his famous “e=mc2” equation, nor Newton his theory of gravity.44  The Court 
 
 34. Id. at 2355. 
 35. Id. at 2357. 
 36. Id. at 2360. 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 40. Id.  Thus, something that is not a process, method, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or an improvement thereof may not be patented; however, this 
list is usually considered so broad and inclusive that courts have held that by passing 
it, Congress intended to include “anything under the sun that is made by man.”  Dia-
mond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981). 
 41. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185. 
 44. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
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has concluded as a general rule that such things are “free to all men and re-
served exclusively to none.”45 
The last important exception to the ability to patent that the Supreme 
Court has defined is that abstract ideas are not patentable.  This concept was 
first set forth in one of the earliest patent cases heard by the Supreme Court.46  
In Le Roy v. Tatham, a case heard in 1852, the Court held that “[a] principle, 
in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive;” and that 
“these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive 
right.”47 
A.  Early Development 
One year after deciding Le Roy v. Tatham, the Court decided the case of 
O’Reilly v. Morse, which discussed in detail the problems associated with 
patenting abstract ideas.48  This case involved the celebrated Samuel Morse, 
inventor of the telegraph and the code that bears his name.49  Mr. Morse had 
filed for, and received, a patent for his invention in 1840.50  This was fol-
lowed by a reissue for improvement in 1846.51  Finally, the patent was reis-
sued again in 1848, which was the patent that the Court was being called on 
to consider.52  Among the claims made in his patent was a claim for “the use 
of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which [he] call[ed] 
electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible 
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances.”53  In deciding the case, the 
Court concluded that this claim was too broad and invalidated the claim.54  It 
noted that Morse was attempting to patent the very idea of written communi-
cation by electro-magnetism independent of the means or machinery used.55  
The Court was concerned that granting this patent would prevent any future 
inventor from patenting a device that used the same concept even if it did so 
in a manner that was less complicated, more reliable, or cheaper.56  In addi-
tion, the Court noted that the nature of this patent would give Morse control 
over any future combination of his invention and then-unknown technology.57  
 
 45. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130. 
 46. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852). 
 47. Id. 
 48. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112 (1853). 
 49. Id. at 71; Carleton Mabee, Samuel F.B. Morse, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/393059/Samuel-FB-Morse (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2015). 
 50. O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 83. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 112. 
 54. Id. at 113, 120. 
 55. Id. at 113. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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This essentially meant that Morse was claiming “an exclusive right to use a 
manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not invented, 
and therefore could not describe when he obtained his patent.”58 
Fast-forward nearly 120 years to the case of Gottschalk v. Benson.59  
This case, which represented the next milestone in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence on abstract ideas, involved an attempt to patent a method for convert-
ing binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals.60  In other 
words, the patent was issued for a process by which computers could solve 
mathematical problems by converting one form of numerals into another us-
ing a specific formula.61  The claim was not limited to any particular technol-
ogy, machine, or end use, and applied to any digital computer.62  The Court 
concluded that the patent was in fact attempting to patent an idea, namely the 
formula itself.63  The Court came to this conclusion by observing that the 
application of the patent had no use except in connection with a digital com-
puter.64  Therefore, the only use for the formula was for the proposed process, 
and allowing a patent on the process would effectively preempt the formula 
and serve as a patent on the formula itself.65  The Court further observed that 
the claim was “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and un-
known uses of the [binary-coded decimal] to pure binary conversion.”66  
Once again, the Court held that “abstract intellectual concepts are not patent-
able, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”67  
However, it is important to note that the Court carved out a particular caveat: 
while an abstract idea was not patentable, an application of such an idea “to a 
new and useful end” might be.68 
The extent of this caveat was more fully explored in the Supreme 
Court’s next important patent case, Parker v. Flook, a decision handed down 
in 1978.69  Flook concerned a patent for a process for updating “alarm limits” 
during catalytic conversions.70  These alarm limits were numbers that indicat-
ed upper thresholds for various conditions, such as temperature and pressure, 
which would trigger an alarm if reached during the catalytic conversion.71  
The patent in this case consisted solely of a new algorithm or mathematical 
formula that was applied as part of a preexisting conventional three-step pro-
 
 58. Id. 
 59. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 60. Id. at 64. 
 61. Id. at 65. 
 62. Id. at 64. 
 63. Id. at 71. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 71-72. 
 66. Id. at 68. 
 67. Id. at 67. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 70. Id. at 585. 
 71. Id. 
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cess to update the alarm limits during the catalytic conversion of hydrocar-
bons.72  Therefore, the question before the Court was whether a new formula 
applied to an existing process was patent eligible.73 
The respondent in Flook tried to distance himself from the precedent in 
Benson, reasoning that, because he was restricting his use of the formula to a 
specific purpose, he would not preempt the formula and that its other uses 
would remain part of the public domain.74  The Court did not accept this ar-
gument.75  The Court first reaffirmed the idea that the mere fact that a patent 
included an abstract idea did not preclude it from patent eligibility if it man-
aged to apply that idea to a new and useful end.76  But the Court went on to 
say that “[t]he process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be 
new and useful” and that “the novelty of the mathematical algorithm is not a 
determining factor at all.”77  The Court reasoned that, known or unknown, 
such mathematical formulas remained part of the “basic tools of scientific and 
technological work” and were to be considered part of the prior art, that is, 
known and familiar.78  The Court concluded that, because the patent as a 
whole contained no new inventive feature other than the un-patentable math-
ematical formula, it was not patentable.79 
The case of Diamond v. Diehr, handed down three years later, illustrates 
when an abstract idea may be patented.80  In Diehr, the patent at issue con-
cerned a process for molding raw rubber into cured, finished products.81  The 
respondents claimed that their patent differed from the existing process in that 
they constantly measured the temperature inside the mold and then used a 
mathematical formula to accurately calculate the required curing time.82  The 
Court noted that the patent relied on the use of a well-known mathematical 
formula to calculate the curing times.83  However, the Court concluded that 
the patent would not preempt the formula because it was tied to all the other 
steps in the claimed process.84  In short, the Court held that the claimed patent 
was “nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not [] an 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 588. 
 74. Id. at 590. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 590-91. 
 77. Id. at 591. 
 78. Id. at 591-92 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
 79. Id. at 594. 
 80. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 81. Id. at 177. 
 82. Id. at 178. 
 83. Id. at 187.  The mathematical equation in question was the Arrhenius Equa-
tion.  Id. at 178.  This equation was first proposed by Svante Arrhenius in 1889.  Wik-
ipedia, Arrhenius Equation, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrhenius_equation (as of 
Apr. 10, 2015, 14:18 GMT). 
 84. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. 
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attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”85  The Court affirmed what it had 
previously hinted at, that a claim that included an abstract idea was patenta-
ble, provided that the abstract idea was applied as part of a process that – as a 
whole – was new or innovative and thus something that the patent laws were 
designed to protect.86  Despite the Court’s insistence that the cases of Flook 
and Diehr were distinguishable, they contained enough similarities to create 
problems for the lower courts tasked with applying them. 
B.  Developments in the Lower Courts 
Following the trilogy of Benson, Flook, and Diehr, approximately thirty 
years passed with relatively few Supreme Court decisions concerning patents, 
a span that was broken in 2010 with the case of Bilski v. Kappos.87  During 
this thirty-year drought, however, the lower federal circuit courts were busy 
attempting to formulate a test that would allow them to administer the Su-
preme Court’s prior decisions.  One of the first tests the lower courts devel-
oped was called the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, developed by the Court of 
Customs and Patents Appeals.88  This test was named after a trilogy of cases 
that took place shortly after Flook.89  The test itself consisted of two parts.  
First, the court analyzed the patent at issue to determine if it contained an 
abstract idea, like a mathematical algorithm.90  If such an idea was found, 
then the claim had to be analyzed in its entirety to see if that idea was applied 
to any “physical elements or process steps.”91  If so, then the idea would be 
patentable; if it failed to apply the algorithm to a physical element or step and 
instead simply produced the mathematical result, then it would not be.92  The 
courts focused primarily on the existence of “mathematical algorithms” for 
their determination of abstractness, drawing on the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions.93  This led to some rather liberal readings where ideas that might oth-
erwise have been considered abstract were found not to be for lack of an algo-
rithm.94 
However, the Freeman-Walter-Abele test proved to be short-lived.  At 
nearly the same time it was being developed, the Federal Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit was formed.95  In 1998, this new court, which initially 
 
 85. Id. at 191. 
 86. Id. at 192-93. 
 87. 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 88. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see also Ebby Abraham, 
Note, Bilski v. Kappos: Sideline Analysis from the First Inning of Play, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 15, 26 (2011). 
 89. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d at 915. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 915-16. 
 94. Id. at 916. 
 95. Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
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adopted the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, would dismiss it in favor of a new 
test.96  This test, labeled the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test, fo-
cused on whether the abstract idea had been employed to achieve some prac-
tical application creating a useful, concrete, and tangible result.97  In dismiss-
ing the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, the court noted that it could easily be 
misleading, as it was possible for a patent application to contain an abstract 
idea like an algorithm and yet still be patent eligible.98  Instead, the court 
determined that the unpatentability of such abstract ideas arose from them 
being “disembodied concepts” that were in no way useful and that the obvi-
ous cure was to apply the algorithms in a useful way.99  In deciding the case, 
the court also placed significant emphasis on the language of 35 U.S.C Sec-
tion 101 as interpreted by the Supreme Court to allow “anything under the 
sun that is made by man.”100  Thus, the court was putting significant emphasis 
on Diehr and later cases and reading the Supreme Court’s decisions and the 
legislative intent even more broadly.101 
For this reason, in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
Group, Inc., the Federal Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a 
patent that involved managing mutual funds was patent eligible even though 
it contained and relied upon an abstract mathematical algorithm.102  This case 
is especially important because the court eliminated the so called “business 
method” exception.103  This exception had been developed by some judges 
and scholars based on older but no longer relevant legal principles.104  The 
court instead determined that whatever business method exception did exist 
was merely a subset of another patent eligibility exception, i.e. those cases 
that had been seen as striking down patents as being business methods had 
really been striking them down for abstractness, obviousness, or lack of nov-
elty.105  This considerably widened the fields of what could be patented. 
However, in 2008 the Federal Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
would eventually reject the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test as 
well.106  In its place, the court adopted the “machine-or-transformation” 
 
 96. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-
74 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 97. Id. at 1373. 
 98. Id. at 1374. 
 99. Id. at 1373. 
 100. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.; see also AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356, 
1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (applying same test to a patent for the improvement of message 
recording for telephone systems and finding it patent eligible despite it being depend-
ent on simple mathematical equations). 
 103. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1375-76. 
 106. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/10
2015] EXPLORING THE ABSTRACT 547 
test.107  Under this test, the court concluded that an idea was patent eligible if 
“it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus” or “transforms a particular 
article into a different state or thing.”108  Once again, this test was based heav-
ily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Diehr.109  Interestingly, the court that 
created the test admitted the difficulty of squaring it with the earlier Supreme 
Court decision in Benson, and its efforts to defend the test were questioned by 
both the respondents in the case and amici.110 
C.  The Supreme Court Begins to Reexamine the Doctrine 
The “machine-or-transformation” test was the test that the Supreme 
Court considered in the Bilski case.111  The patent at stake in Bilski was a 
business method patent that purported to provide a means for hedging against 
risk.112  The Court considered the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-
transformation test before ultimately rejecting it as the sole test for patent 
eligibility.113  However, the Court did concede that the test represented a 
good clue as to patent eligibility.114  Despite dismissing the tests proposed by 
the lower courts, the Supreme Court declined to institute its own.115  All of 
the justices agreed that the idea at issue constituted an abstract idea and there-
fore was not patent eligible.116  The Court noted that the concept of hedging 
was a fundamental economic principle, a staple of any introductory course in 
finance.117  The Court concluded that granting the patent would effectively 
preempt the idea and prevent anyone else from using it.118  Thus, the Court 
began to shift the focus of abstractness from the existence of specific proper-
ties, such as mathematical algorithms, back toward the concept of preemption 
outlined in Benson and Flook.  Unfortunately, because the Court made this 
decision without announcing a new test of its own, it left the lower courts to 
fend for themselves once more. 
While the Court in Bilski was unwilling to develop a test for patents in-
volving abstract ideas, it did manage to develop a test for those involving 
laws of nature in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc.119  The patent in Mayo concerned the application of laws of nature re-
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 954. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 955. 
 111. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010). 
 112. Id. at 599. 
 113. Id. at 603. 
 114. Id. at 604. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 611, 619 (Stevens, J., concurring), 658 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 117. Id. at 611 (majority opinion) (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008)). 
 118. Id. at 611-12. 
 119. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012). 
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garding the concentration of certain thiopurine metabolites in the bloodstream 
to determine the proper dose of drugs that were needed to treat a patient.120  
The test that the Supreme Court developed to determine the patent’s eligibil-
ity consisted of two parts.121  First, the Court asked if the patent in question 
set forth a law of nature.122  If the Court determined that it did, as was the 
case in Mayo, it then asked if the patent claims put forward enough additional 
features to show that that the claim at issue actually incorporated the natural 
law into some new and useful process.123  To put it another way, the Court 
wanted sufficient application to ensure that the patent was not merely the 
result of “a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.”124  
The Court made it very clear that it would not accept a patent that did little 
more than re-state the law of nature and then simply say, “apply it.”125  The 
Court then proceeded to examine the patent at issue in Mayo and determined 
that this was precisely what the patent did.126  The essence of the patent, ac-
cording to the Court, was to tell doctors to first administer thiopurine, then 
measure the thiopurine metabolites in the blood, and finally to apply the law 
of nature to determine the amount of drug to give.127  Because the Court de-
termined that these steps did not add enough to transform the un-patentable 
law of nature into a patentable process, it found the claim patent ineligible.128 
The case of Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc., decided the year following Mayo, provides a curious comparison.129  
Myriad concerned a patent for specifically isolated sections of human DNA 
and its synthetically created cDNA counterpart.130  Myriad Genetics, Inc. 
(“Myriad”), the Company that had filed the patent, had discovered the precise 
location of two specific genes in human DNA, mutations of which increase 
the risk of developing some forms of breast and ovarian cancer.131  In addi-
tion to the specific DNA, Myriad was also seeking a patent on the cDNA 
(complimentary DNA), which was identical to the DNA except for the re-
moval of the non-coding portions so that only the genetically coding (and 
therefore medically interesting) portions of the DNA remained.132  The Court 
quickly rejected the patent for the isolated forms of human DNA.133  It con-
cluded that the mere act of finding and isolating the already-existing DNA 
 
 120. Id. at 1294. 
 121. Id. at 1297. 
 122. Id. at 1296-97. 
 123. Id. at 1297. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1294. 
 126. Id. at 1298. 
 127. Id. at 1295. 
 128. Id. at 1298. 
 129. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 130. Id. at 2112. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 2113. 
 133. Id. at 2117. 
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did not make them patent eligible since they were existing natural phenome-
na.134  The Court relied on the fact that Myriad neither created nor altered the 
DNA and that Myriad’s only contribution was to isolate it.135  It further em-
phasized that the patents were not concerned with the mere chemical structure 
of the DNA but went to the underlying genetic information stored within it.136  
However, the Court did find that the artificially created sections of cDNA 
were patent eligible.137  The Court found this to be true even though the 
methods employed in creating the cDNA were “well known in the field of 
genetics.”138  It rested its holding on the idea that the laboratory technician 
who created the cDNA had undoubtedly created something that was new and 
thus not a product of nature.139  The Court seemed to indicate that the mere 
act of synthetically replicating the DNA made the synthetic replications pa-
tent eligible.  This case, and all those that came before it, formed the body of 
precedent that steered the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. 
v. CLS Bank International. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
 The Court began its discussion of the instant case by reiterating the 
policy considerations behind its previous decisions.140  It noted that the pri-
mary concern with the patenting of abstract ideas was one of “pre-
emption.”141  These abstract ideas, the Court reasoned, were the basic “build-
ing blocks of human ingenuity,” and allowing them to be patented would do 
more harm than good by monopolizing the necessary tools for future devel-
opment and preventing the innovation that the patent laws were designed to 
protect.142  However, the Court also noted that this concern had to be treated 
sparingly, because at a basic level nearly all inventions relied on laws of na-
ture, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas in some way.143  Therefore, the 
Court concluded that it needed to establish a balance between those patents 
that tried to claim rights to basic concepts and those that applied those con-
cepts to make something new.144 
Based on these policy concerns, the Court decided to adapt the test it 
had formally set out in Mayo regarding laws of nature and apply it to the con-
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 2115. 
 136. Id. at 2118. 
 137. Id. at 2119. 
 138. Id. at 2112. 
 139. Id. at 2119. 
 140. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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cept of abstract ideas.145  According to the Court, this test consisted of two 
parts.146  First the Court asked, “Is there a claim relating to a patent-ineligible 
abstract idea?”147  If this question was answered in the affirmative, the next 
question became, “Is there anything more to the claim?”148  The Court de-
scribed this test as “a search for an inventive concept,” a term it defined as 
some “element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that 
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the 
[abstract idea] itself.’”149  The Court made clear that in making this determi-
nation, the claim elements in the patent had to be considered both individual-
ly and as a whole with an eye toward seeing if the claims “transformed” the 
abstract idea into something that could be patented.150 
The Court next applied this new test to the claims before it.151  The 
Court determined that the patents at issue were drawn to the idea of interme-
diate settlement, or the use of third parties to reduce settlement risk.152  The 
Court further noted that such an idea was fundamental to the practice of eco-
nomics and had a long standing and use in our commercial system.153  It 
therefore concluded that the claim was, in fact, an abstract idea.154  The Court 
in large part based its conclusion on the strong parallels between these patents 
and the patents that were before it in Bilski.155  It concluded that there was 
“no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and 
the concept of intermediate settlement” in the instant case, and consequently 
the result was the same as in Bilski.156 
Having made its determination that the patent in question represented an 
abstract idea, the Court then turned to the next question in the Mayo frame-
work: “Is there anything more?”157  First, the Court noted that neither simply 
adding an instruction to apply an abstract idea nor limiting its use to a specif-
ic “technological environment” was enough to complete the transfor-
mation.158  The Court pointed out that combining these two ideas by includ-
ing instructions to “apply it with a computer” equally failed.159  However, the 
 
 145. Id. at 2355. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1294 (2012)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 2356. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 2357. 
 155. Id. at 2356. 
 156. Id. at 2357. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 2358 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610-11 (2010)). 
 159. Id. 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/10
2015] EXPLORING THE ABSTRACT 551 
Court concluded that this was exactly what the petitioners had done.160  The 
Court determined that each step of the patent did nothing more than “require 
a generic computer to perform generic computer functions” and that, when 
taken as a whole, the patent did nothing more than describe the process of 
intermediate settlement on a generic computer.161  Having failed to find an 
“inventive concept” in the patent, the Court held that there was not enough to 
transform the idea from one that was abstract to one that would be patent 
eligible.162 
Because the petitioners in the case had attempted to patent not only the 
method but also the system and medium for doing so, the Court took a brief 
look at the system and medium claims.163  However, the Court determined 
that these claims failed for primarily the same reason.164  The Court noted 
that, similar to how the method claim amounted to nothing more than instruc-
tions to implement an abstract idea on a generic computer, the system claim 
was just a list of generic computer components configured to do the same 
thing.165  The petitioners had already conceded in the lower courts that the 
media claim was entirely dependent on the method claim.166  Having thus 
concluded that the patent in question claimed an abstract idea and little else, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Federal Circuit, holding the 
patent to be ineligible.167 
V.  COMMENT 
In deciding the case of Alice, the Supreme Court managed to finally 
provide a definitive test for cases where patents potentially claim abstract 
ideas.  However, the Court’s decision leaves open some significant questions 
and potentially raises several new ones that will demand answers.  First, what 
exactly constitutes an “abstract idea” given what the Court has said in this 
case and in its previous cases?  Second, what is the full meaning of the 
Court’s “inventive concept” requirement?  Finally, how are we to interpret 
this decision in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Myriad, which may 
significantly alter the Court’s requirement for “something more”? 
 
 160. Id. at 2359. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 2360. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 2351, 2360. 
 165. Id. at 2360. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  Justice Sotomayor filed a brief concurrence, joined by Justice Ginsburg 
and Justice Breyer, that agreed with the majority’s holding that the patents contained 
an abstract idea and therefore were patent ineligible; however, Justice Sotomayor also 
sought to extend the holding to say that “business methods” were not a process under 
Section 101 and were therefore not patent eligible as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion.  Id. at 2360-61 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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A.  What Is Abstract? 
The Court refused to clearly answer the question of what exactly consti-
tutes an abstract idea.  In making its decision, it saw fit merely to rely on the 
strong similarities between the patent at stake in Alice and the one at stake in 
Bilski.168  The Court directly refused to define the “precise contours of the 
abstract ideas category.”169  However, while the Court refused to provide a 
definition, it did provide some important clues to help identify when some-
thing might be abstract.  The Court focused on the long history of the use of 
clearinghouses in economic systems.170  It cited to a scholarly article dating 
all the way back to 1896171 and also referred to the use of these clearinghous-
es as being “a building block of the modern economy.”172  Clearly, the 
Court’s focus was on both the length and breadth of the ideas being put for-
ward.  This echoes the Court’s longstanding concerns regarding preemption 
and is therefore not particularly surprising.  What is somewhat surprising, 
however, is the way that both of these ideas are drawn to the concept of nov-
elty.  This is surprising because novelty is already a requirement for patent 
eligibility under Section 102.173  Perhaps then, this phenomenon is best ex-
plained as the Court attempting to expand the concept of novelty beyond the 
requirement that the patent be novel as a whole and instead requiring that 
some significant portion of the underlying idea must also be novel.  This may 
present something of a problem as it may lead some to misconstrue the 
Court’s intentions.174  In any event, the long history and use language is what 
has currently played the most important factor in the lower courts that have 
been called upon to interpret Alice.175 
While the Court makes clear that this long history and use is a good in-
dicator of an abstract idea, it has more difficulty squaring it away with some 
 
 168. Id. at 2357 (majority opinion). 
 169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170. Id. at 2356. 
 171. Id. (citing Emery, Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the 
United States, in 7 STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 283, 346-56 
(1896)). 
 172. Id. 
 173. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 174. See infra Part V.B. 
 175. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (finding patent to be, at heart, a process for creating transaction performance 
guaranties which had a long history and use in financial market and thus declared it 
ineligible under Section 101); Cogent Med., Inc. v. Elsevier Inc., Nos. C-13-4479-
RMW, C-13-4483, C-13-4486,  2014 WL 4966326 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014) (find-
ing patent went toward abstract idea of maintaining and searching a library for infor-
mation, thereby making it ineligible under Section 101); Open Text S.A. v. Alfresco 
Software Ltd., 13-CV-04843-JD, 2014 WL 4684429 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2014) (find-
ing patent went to the very old practice of interacting with customers to gain feedback 
and promote sales and that patent was ineligible under Section 101). 
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of its older decisions.  For instance, the cases of Morse and Benson contained 
abstract ideas that would not fit comfortably within the long history and use 
terminology the Court laid down in this decision.  Indeed, the patents in these 
cases contained underlying ideas that were new and innovative and had not 
been subject to either long history or use, yet the Court still found them to be 
abstract.  However, there is nothing in the case that would seem to overtly 
contradict or overrule these decisions sub silentio.  The Court specifically 
cites to both Morse and Benson for support in the case.176  This conclusion is 
further buttressed by the Court’s use of the basic “building blocks” language 
that would suggest that it has no interest in abandoning these previous cas-
es.177  As discussed below, this may very well affect how the second half of 
the test is meant to be interpreted.178  For now, it is sufficient to establish that 
both definitions – basic building blocks and long history and use – can be 
used for determining abstractness. 
Another issue that deserves some attention is the question of the busi-
ness method exception.  The concurrence called for a holding that a business 
method claim could not constitute a process under the meaning of Section 
101.179  In other words, the concurrence would call for a ban on business 
methods being considered patent eligible.  While the majority does not go 
that far, it is still questionable how much room this decision leaves for these 
types of patents.  The Court’s long history and use language seems to extend 
beyond the older building blocks language to encapsulate not just ideas that 
are fundamental to scientific development, but also ideas that seek to improve 
upon common practices.  In other words, by adopting this language it would 
appear that the Court has effectively sidestepped the business methods excep-
tion by allowing lower courts a new avenue for finding patent ineligibility 
without resorting to a direct ban.180 
B.  What Is an Inventive Concept? 
The second step in the Court’s new test is the quest for “something 
more,” the inventive concept requirement.181  The Court has more to say 
about what does not constitute an inventive concept than what does.  For in-
stance, the Court focused on the idea that the implementation of a generic 
computer is not enough.182  This by no means equates to a ban on the patent-
 
 176. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2354-55. 
 177. Id. at 2354. 
 178. See infra Part V.B. 
 179. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 180. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Symposium: Business Methods as “Abstract Ideas” – 
Explaining the Opacity of Alice and Bilski, SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2014, 1:08 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-business-methods-as-abstract-ideas-
explaining-the-opacity-of-alice-and-bilski/. 
 181. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2357. 
 182. Id. at 2358. 
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ing of software, as some had feared.183  However, it is definitely language 
that has been instrumental in the decisions of several lower courts that have 
invalidated patents on this ground.184  While this language formed the basis of 
the Court’s determination that the patents in question did not have an in-
ventive concept beyond the ineligible abstract idea, it does not end the discus-
sion of what an inventive concept actually is. 
A more interesting question is how this inventive concept requirement 
differs from the requirement of novelty as set forth in Section 102.185  It can 
be argued that there is no difference and that the requirement for an inventive 
concept is just another way of requiring novelty.  An alternative consideration 
is whether the inventive concept requirement intrudes on the obviousness 
requirement of Section 103.186  It is not unreasonable to argue that what is not 
inventive is obvious and thus, that this requirement does nothing more than 
restate the requirements of Section 102 and Section 103.  At least some who 
have commented on the case have suggested that the inventive concept re-
quirement does just that.187  But this understanding does not seem to square 
with what the Court had to say.  It may well explain the decision in the im-
mediate case where the patents in question did seem to lack novelty or were 
obvious. 
However, this understanding creates a problem.  If the inventive concept 
requirement does nothing more than duplicate the novelty or non-obvious 
requirements, then it could not explain the Court’s decisions in cases where 
the abstract idea rests at the point of novelty.  This is the situation in cases 
like Morse and Benson where what was being claimed was not an improve-
ment on an idea with a long history and use, but rather something relatively 
new.  Considering Morse for example, the Court did not find the abstract idea 
unpatentable because of a lack of novelty or obviousness of the design, but 
rather out of a fear of preemption.188  It is this fear of preemption the Court 
wishes to address with the inventive concept requirement.  The dictum of the 
majority’s opinion supports this conclusion when describing the search for an 
inventive concept to mean a search for some additional features that will en-
 
 183. David Kappos, Symposium: Supreme Court Leaves Patent Protection for 
Software Innovation Intact, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-supreme-court-leaves-patent-protection-for-
software-innovation-intact/. 
 184. E.g., Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 
2014); Cogent Med., Inc. v. Elsevier Inc., No. C-13-4479-RMW, 2014 WL 4966326, 
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014); Open Text S.A. v. Alfresco Software Ltd, No. 13-
CV-04843-JD, 2014 WL 4684429, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2014). 
 185. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 186. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 187. See Robert Merges, Symposium: Go Ask Alice – What Can You Patent After 
Alice v. CLS Bank?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014, 12:04 PM), http://www.scotusb-
log.com/2014/06/symposium-go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-after-alice-v-cls-
bank/. 
 188. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 120-21 (1853). 
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sure “the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the 
[abstract idea].”189  Thus, the term “inventive concept” is deceptively mis-
leading and masks the true nature of the test, which is a question of preemp-
tion. 
This, of course, may create significant problems if lower courts fail to 
understand the Court’s dicta or consider the Court’s previous cases.  If the 
lower courts place too much emphasis on the long history and use language 
for instance, and not the basic building blocks language of earlier Supreme 
Court decisions, they may repeat the mistake of earlier courts, such as those 
that read Benson as being a ban on patenting mathematical algorithms and 
nothing else.  Those wishing to apply the test must therefore focus more on 
the idea of whether the patent in question risks preemption as opposed to 
whether the underlying idea is novel.  It is worth mentioning that at least one 
case that has been decided since Alice on grounds similar to this has taken the 
Court’s considerations to heart and not fallen into this trap.190 
C.  Comparing Alice and Mayo with Myriad 
The cases of Alice and Mayo create a curious comparison with Myriad 
that is worthy of inquiry.  In Alice, the Supreme Court specifically stated that 
the test it developed in Mayo was to apply to laws of nature, natural phenom-
ena, and abstract ideas.191  In other words, the test developed in Mayo should 
have been the same for the cases of Mayo, Myriad, and Alice.  Yet, it is ques-
tionable as to whether this actually occurred.  In Myriad, the Court found that 
cDNA that coded for the exact same information as its DNA analog was pa-
tent eligible while the DNA itself was not.192  If the genetic information con-
tained within the DNA was itself a product of nature, as the Court concluded, 
then the second part of the Alice test must be applied.  Thus, it must be de-
termined if there was any “inventive concept.”  In other words, was there any 
 
 189. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. 
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012)). 
 190. In the case of McRO, Inc. v. Atlus U.S.A. and its siblings, for example, the 
court found the claims to be patent-ineligible abstract ideas despite the fact that they 
were in some ways novel.  No. SACV 13-1870-GW FFMX, 2014 WL 4772196, at 
*13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014).  The claim in the case concerned a patent for 3D 
computer animation that involved connecting a character’s speech with the way his 
mouth was moving.  Id. at *1-2.  The patent improved on previous methods for doing 
so by using a system of mathematical rules to automate a process that previously had 
to be carried out manually by an artist.  Id. at *11.  The court based its considerations 
on the concern of preemption, holding that while the patents on their face may not 
seem abstract, they would preempt the use of a mathematical rule-based approach for 
automatic lip synchronization in 3D animation.  Id.  Thus, the court held them to be 
ineligible.  Id. at *13. 
 191. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 
 192. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 
2119 (2013). 
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indicator that the patent on the cDNA was more than a drafting attempt to 
patent the genetic code itself?  As a purely factual matter, it would appear 
not; the cDNA differed only in the removal of the noncoding – and thus irrel-
evant – portions of the DNA, leaving the underlying genetic code intact.  
Therefore, the Court’s emphasis on the lab technician “unquestionably 
creat[ing] something new” seems misplaced considering that it acknowledges 
that it is the genetic information that Myriad sought to patent, which re-
mained unchanged.193  Since it is the genetic information that is desirable, it 
is hard to say how the cDNA is anything more than a draftsman’s effort to 
monopolize the product of nature itself. 
Given this seeming incongruity between the test adopted in Alice and 
the result in Myriad, what can be learned?  It is possible that the results 
reached in these two cases are simply irreconcilable.  The Supreme Court 
might have just used two different tests, despite what it claimed.  When con-
sidering this, it is worth noting that the Court did not specifically adopt or 
indeed even address the Mayo test in Myriad, despite clearly having the op-
portunity to do so.194 
Alternatively, these two decisions could be read as similar to the “Ma-
chine or Transformation” test developed by the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit in Bilski.195  There the court was focused on language adopted by 
the Supreme Court in Diehr that stated that “transforming or reducing an 
article to a different state of thing” was evidence of patent eligibility.196  The 
Supreme Court rejected “Machine or Transformation” as being the definitive 
test, but did acknowledge its use as an investigative tool in determining patent 
eligibility.197  Therefore, patent eligibility of abstract ideas may possibly be 
shown by emphasizing the way in which such ideas are used to transform 
material or data from one form to another as part of a novel process, even if 
there is some threat of preemption.  While the inventive concept requirement 
is best read as a prohibition on preemption, the dicta in Bilski and the result in 
Myriad would seem to strongly suggest some degree of preemption is ac-
ceptable, provided some new material or data is produced as a result.  Practi-
tioners attempting to defend such patents may profit from emphasizing the 
analogy to the cDNA in Myriad that is patent eligible under the same test. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The patent process provides important means of incentivizing the dis-
covery and development of new ideas.198  Yet there must be some limit to 
what can patented, lest we risk stifling the market and preventing new dis-
 
 193. Id. at 2118-19. 
 194. CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 198 (3d ed. 2014). 
 195. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010). 
 198. NARD, supra note 194, at 2-3. 
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covery by removing the necessary starting points on which new ideas may be 
built.  It is in this balance between the creation of monopolies over ideas to 
promote investment and protecting innovation by ensuring necessary tools are 
readily available that the common law patent eligibility exceptions become 
important.  The case of Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International is an 
important milestone in the development of these exceptions.  Faced with an 
ever-expanding and changing technological world, the Court devised a means 
by which the courts and the government may properly establish the limita-
tions of the patent system.  While the decision leaves open several questions, 
its dicta, combined with earlier precedents, may provide a good clue for help-
ing the lower courts to adjudicate patent disputes in a sensible manner.  To 
that end, it is necessary that the Alice decision be read in close connection 
with the Court’s previous decisions to prevent a repeat of some of the mis-
takes of the past. 
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